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Abstract
This article applies the concept of ritual to cybersecurity expertise, beginning with the cybersecurity “skills gap”: the per-
ceived lack of suitably qualified professionals necessary to tackle contemporary cybersecurity challenges. It proposes that
cybersecurity expertise is best understood as a skilled performance which satisfies decision-makers’ demands for risk
management. This alternative understanding of cybersecurity expertise enables investigation of the types of performance
involved in key events which congregate experts together: cybersecurity conferences. The article makes two key claims,
which are empirically based on participant observation of cybersecurity conferences in the Middle East. First, that cyber-
security conferences are ritualized activities which create an expert community across international boundaries despite
significant political and social differences. Second, that the ritualized physical separation between disinterested knowledge-
sharing and commercial advertisement at these conferences enacts an ideal of “pure” cybersecurity expertise rarely en-
countered elsewhere,withoutwhich the claims to knowledgemade by cybersecurity expertswould be greatly undermined.
The approach taken in this article is thus a new direction for cybersecurity research, with significant implications for other
areas of international politics.
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1. Introduction
In 1944, the team programming the IBM Mark I, a mam-
moth computing machine built in the US during WWII to
assist military calculations, had a surprising routine:
When the program was punched into a tape and the
moment came to test it, the Mark I crew, as a joke
that became a ritual, would pull out a prayer rug, face
east, and pray that their workwould prove acceptable.
(Isaacson, 2015)
This short anecdote suggests that rituals exist in techno-
logical practices such as cybersecurity, even if most cy-
bersecurity rituals are not as clearly defined as prayer
and have little explicit religious content. It also serves as
a reminder of the cultural specificity of the Internet’s ori-
gins, in contrast to its now global reach. Cyberspace is
no longer the province only of those who pray towards
Mecca satirically, and cybersecurity is a concern across
nations, religions and cultures.
This article applies the concept of ritual to the cy-
bersecurity “skills gap”: the perceived lack of suitably
qualified professionals necessary to tackle contemporary
cybersecurity challenges. It draws on theories of exper-
tise in International Relations (IR) to interpret this skills
gap not as an objective absence of people or knowl-
edge, but as an ideal socially constructed in tandem
with an ever-widening sphere of cybersecurity threats.
It proposes that cybersecurity expertise is best under-
stood as enacted: as a skilled performance which sat-
isfies decision-makers’ demands for risk management.
This alternative understanding of cybersecurity exper-
tise as performance enables investigation of the types of
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performance at key events which congregate experts to-
gether: cybersecurity conferences.
This article makes two key claims, which are em-
pirically based on participant observation of cybersecu-
rity conferences in the Middle East. First, that cyberse-
curity conferences are ritualized activities which create
an expert community across international boundaries
despite significant political and social differences. Sec-
ond, that the ritualized physical separation between dis-
interested knowledge-sharing and commercial advertise-
ment at these conferences enacts an ideal of “pure” cy-
bersecurity expertisewithoutwhich claims to knowledge
would be greatly undermined.
This article has three main parts. The first introduces
the cybersecurity skills gap and offers an alternative in-
terpretation of cybersecurity expertise as performance.
The second identifies conferences as a key site for par-
ticipant observation and details the growth of cyberse-
curity conferences in the Middle East. The third applies
the concept of ritual to these conferences. Following the
conclusion, a postscript reflexively considers my role as
a participant observer.
2. Cybersecurity Expertise
Cybersecurity experts are in great demand. A survey
in 2015 predicted a “shortfall” of 1.5 million “informa-
tion security professionals” by 2020 ((ISC)2, 2015), and
a year later another survey increased this forecast to a
2 million “shortage” of “cybersecurity professionals” by
2019 (ISACA, 2016). Themessage of these surveys, which
are partly intended to raise awareness and business for
those conducting them, is clear: there is a cybersecurity
“skills gap”, where “cyberattacks are growing, but the tal-
ent pool of defenders is not keeping pace” (ISACA, 2016).
Current policy responses to this skills gap focus on adapt-
ing curricula, creating competitions to demonstrate tech-
nical skill, and training staff on-the-job (Vogel, 2016).
These policies are hampered by the unclear con-
tent of cybersecurity expertise. Cybersecurity profession-
als appear to require a vast range of skills from com-
munications, compliance, data analytics and organiza-
tional psychology, as well as information technology (IT)
(Pironti, 2013). This has led some to conclude that there
is “surprisingly little consensus” around the cybersecu-
rity skillset (Wolff, 2016). To counter this issue, the UK
government has created a “cybersecurity body of knowl-
edge” or CyBOK programme, which aims to build up a
repository of core data for cybersecurity (Ensor, 2017).
Likemany observers of the lack of clarity in cybersecurity
expertise, the creator of this programme attributes the
problem solely to the “relative youth” of cybersecurity
(Ensor, 2017). This suggests that cybersecurity is merely
a “nascent epistemic community” (Stevens, 2012), which
has yet to settle on its area of exclusive competence.
However, this narrative of novelty is deceptively sim-
ple. Novelty is not an external condition to which cyber-
security experts must respond, but rather a concept of
time integral to the field itself. In other words, “the field
of cyber security seems pervaded by a profound sense
of frustration and disorientation at being trapped in an
accelerating present, cut off by history” (Stevens, 2015,
p. 93). Attributing the cybersecurity skills gap simply to
an increasing rate of technological change—apermanent
state of novelty—prevents analysis of the social and polit-
ical ingredients which constitute cybersecurity as an ex-
pert domain.
Instead, contest is at the heart of cybersecurity ex-
pertise, which has been repeatedly refigured according
to its political context (Barnard-Wills & Ashenden, 2012;
Bendrath, 2001; Dunn Cavelty, 2008). Although an influ-
ential analysis of the social construction of cybersecurity
argues that “cyber security can be seen as ‘computer
security’ plus ‘securitization’” (Hansen & Nissenbaum,
2009, p. 13), the suggestion that contest is limited to
securitization—the framing of political issues as a se-
curity concern—implies that computer security itself is
clearly defined. In contrast, others argue that the con-
tent of computer security, and how and where it over-
laps with or adopts labels of cybersecurity and informa-
tion security, are themselves key areas of contest (Shires
& Smeets, 2017, p. 10).
To understand this contest, I draw on more sophisti-
cated understandings of expertise which have emerged
in IR (for overviews see Bueger, 2014; Cross, 2013).
Such theories hold that, rather than simply import-
ing expert knowledge from their academic or profes-
sional discipline into problems of societal and political
importance, experts instead conduct what Seabrooke
terms “epistemic arbitrage”. This is where experts “me-
diate between knowledge pools for strategic advan-
tage and, if successful, they can become the ‘arbiters’
on what knowledge and practices are most influential”
(Seabrooke, 2014, p. 1). In cybersecurity, the prolifera-
tion of related disciplines allows experts to emphasise
some areas over others in their interpretation of what
counts as cybersecurity expertise, to “create new mar-
kets for their services and to challenge established or-
ders” (Seabrooke, 2014, p. 13). This competitive rug-
pulling in turn stretches and reshapes the domain itself,
redistributing its increasing social, political and financial
capital between software engineers and hardware man-
ufacturers, lawyers, accountants and insurers, psycholo-
gists, intelligence professionals and political scientists.
These views of expertise focus not on expert knowl-
edge in a static, codified form, but on expert practice
and performance. In the words of legal scholar David
Kennedy:
Expert knowledge is human knowledge: a blend of
conscious, semiconscious and wholly unconscious
ideas, full of tensions and contradictions, inhabited by
people who have projects and who think, speak and
act strategically. Style and role count as much as con-
tent. (Kennedy, 2016, p. 278)
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Kennedy here combines Seabrooke’s view of experts as
involved in power struggles, jostling for position and con-
cerned with their individual projects, with an empha-
sis on how expertise is enacted or performed. To be
an expert, one must act as an expert. For cybersecu-
rity, this performance does not only include familiarity
with Internet networks and computer programs, and the
use of specialist tools. Most importantly, it includes the
judgement and communication of certain risks, includ-
ing reputational risk, threats to life and safety, financial
risk, and national security. This expert performance has
been described by some scholars as that of a “cyber-
guru” (Quigley, Burns, & Stallard, 2015), who simplifies
and overstates risks to maximise cybersecurity “hype”
(Lee & Rid, 2014). Kennedy’s view of expertise suggests
in contrast that expert performance is essentially flexi-
ble, and that a nuanced and complex expression of risk
can be more effective than exaggeration. In his words,
“the uncertainty and ambivalence of professional knowl-
edge may be the subtle secret of its success” (Kennedy,
2016, p. 10).
Cybersecurity experts learn this performance in sev-
eral ways. One is to obtain cybersecurity qualifications,
many of which claim to be “practical” and “hands-on”,
explicitly recognising the practice-based nature of exper-
tise. Surveys indicate the popularity of this route; three
quarters of respondents to one industry survey claimed
that professional certifications are an effective way to
demonstrate cybersecurity skills (Intel Security, 2016,
p. 13). However, such qualifications suffer from contest
over the power to become an ‘arbiter’ of professional
practice, in Seabrooke’s terms. As Wolff suggests, the
“desire to profit from providing [cybersecurity] training
may lead to too much competition” (Wolff, 2016), with
the result that cybersecurity qualifications are of uncer-
tain value. Supporting this view, other surveys indicate
that experience is valued above all else: one found that
experience was valued more highly than qualifications
(UK HMGovernment, 2014, p. 15), and another reported
that 93% of respondents thought experience was more
important than qualifications (Sundaram, 2017). While
all theories of expertise would agree that experience is
important, the performance approach gives it an extra
dimension. In this view, cybersecurity experience is not
just a chance to collect further knowledge, but an ap-
prenticeship in which professionals first mimic and then
successfully inhabit the role of expert, pronouncing au-
thoritatively on cybersecurity risks.
We can now reframe the concerns over a cyberse-
curity “skills gap” with which I began this section. The
skills gap stems from a supposed mismatch between the
level of risk and the number of cybersecurity experts.
However, we can now see that this level of risk is itself
the result of a successful performance by those experts.
Crucially, cybersecurity risk expands as more knowledge
pools are brought to bear on cybersecurity, with ever
more additions to the “attack surface” and potential
means for illegitimate access. As long as cybersecurity
continues to accrue social and political capital, this pro-
liferation of relevant domains will continue, and the re-
quired repertoire of the “sufficiently skilled” cybersecu-
rity professional will continue to expand. A gap is the
wrong metaphor for this process, as it obscures the con-
nection between expanding expert performance and in-
creasing risk. Instead of focusing on how to ‘close the
gap’, I examine the performances themselves.
3. Cybersecurity Conferences
Cybersecurity expertise is performed inmany places, not
least in the day-to-day work of cybersecurity profession-
als. One way of accessing this performance is through
participant observation. Participant observation, defined
as “immersion in a community, a cohort, a locale, or
a cluster of related subject positions” (Schatz, 2009), is
closely associated with a commitment to ethnographic
modes of research, which “chronicle aspects of lived
experience and…place that experience in conversation
with prevailing scholarly themes” (Wedeen, 2010). Some
scholars have attempted to access a professional cy-
bersecurity environment—security operations centres,
or SOCs—using participant observation. These scholars
have identified several new aspects of cybersecurity ex-
pert performance, including detailed information about
workflows and reflections on their perceived status, de-
scribed as follows:
SOCs face a constant challenge in in justifying their
value to themanagement. Securitymonitoring, unlike
in any other business, cannot be quantified through
profit margins. Nobody notices the value of a SOC
as long as there is no major breach. (Sundaramurthy,
Case, Truong, Zomlot, & Hoffmann, 2014, p. 49)
This quotation anticipates an underlying tension be-
tween financial incentives and cybersecurity expertise
to which I will return in the last section. In this section
I detail the empirical site of participant observation on
whichmy argument is based. SOCs andother daily profes-
sional environments are not the only locations of expert
performance, which also occurs at professional confer-
ences. As Howard describes in his study of digital democ-
racy activists, conferences, although “occurring in sterile
hotels…still represent key events full of important social
interaction” (Howard, 2002, p. 561). Despite this poten-
tial, conferences are not a traditional ethnographic site,
as they are short, happen infrequently, and move be-
tween different geographical locations. This has posed a
methodological problem for anthropologists, who have
conceptualised conferences and similar phenomena in
several ways: as “transitory” sites; as together forming
a “multi-site” ethnography, or as forming one geograph-
ically discontinuous site (Falzon, 2009, p. 17).
One region where cybersecurity conferences have
become a regular occurrence is in theMiddle East. Using
structured Internet searches, with search terms based
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on cybersecurity and cognate terms such as digital or in-
formation security, with “Middle East” as an initial guid-
ing qualifier, I identified 165 conferences within these
parameters between 2007 and 2016. Larger technology
or security conferences that included cybersecurity as a
minor topic were excluded. The rise in the frequency of
these conferences was significant, from 2 in 2007 to 28
in 2016, as shown in Figure 1. The conferences included
some hosted by cybersecurity vendors, others organised
by professional events companies, and some with sup-
port from governments or international organisations.
The average attendance based on media reports was
around 200 people, excluding one large outlier (GISEC,
with around 4,000 attendees). In numerical terms, this
trend is not especially surprising. The increase in Middle
East cybersecurity conferences could probably be repli-
cated in many areas of the world, as during that decade
cybersecurity grew significantly in the global conscious-
ness. However, the geographical grouping of these con-
ferences is not intuitively obvious, in two ways.
First, although these conferences are often labelled
expansively, as “Middle East”, “Middle East and North
Africa” (MENA), or as “Arab Region”, these conferences
nearly all take place in Egypt and the states of theGulf Co-
operation Council (GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).1 This
narrower representation within the wider Middle East
stems from several political factors. Other countries in
the region are the site of severe conflicts, and although
the Gulf states above are intimately involved in these
conflicts their domestic environments have been rel-
atively unaffected. This stability is connected to com-
mercial incentives for holding the conferences: the GCC
states are the richest in the Middle East due to exten-
sive natural resources, and have—to various extents—
developed their domestic infrastructure to attract global
capital (Held & Ulrichsen, 2011). Cybersecurity concerns
in these states are much more similar to the concerns of
other wealthy, highly connected states than their imme-
diate neighbours (in comparison, Yemen, the only non-
GCC Arab state in the Gulf, has very different Internet is-
sues (Dalek, Deibert, McKune, Gill, & Senft, 2015).
Two other key countries in the Middle East cyberse-
curity landscape, Iran and Israel, are not represented in
the conferences above, for different reasons. Iran is seen
by many as a geopolitical rival to Saudi Arabia and has
conflicted relationships with other Gulf states. Further-
more, Iran is perceived as a threat to the US, which has
a longstanding presence in Egypt and the Gulf, due to its
nuclear ambitions, regional influence, and reciprocal hos-
tile cyber activity. Israel, in contrast, is a global cybersecu-
rity hub in its own right, with a strong military-based cy-
bersecurity sector (Behar, 2016) and traditional isolation
from the Arab world, although covert cooperation exists
in various cybersecurity-related areas (Caspit, 2016; Don-
aghy, 2015; Marczak & Scott-Railton, 2016). In sum, the
narrowed definition of Middle East cybersecurity there-
fore stems not only from domestic characteristics and
commercial incentives, but also wider international rela-
tions in the region.
However, this grouping of conferences is also surpris-
ingly inclusive, as Egypt and the GCC states have sub-
stantial differences which affect their cybersecurity pos-
ture. Egypt does not have the same financial advantages
due to a large population and relative lack of natural
resources, although it also has an outsized military and
security sector and commensurate budgets. The Arab
Spring was experienced very differently, with Egypt un-
“Middle East” cybersecurity conferences (N = 165)
Year
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Figure 1. “Middle East” cybersecurity conferences.
1 The exception was the MENA Information Security conference 2011 in Amman, Jordan. For further discussion about the scope of this term, see Bonine,
Amanat and Gasper (2011).
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dergoing repeated changes of government and the GCC
cooperating in repression against activists (Matthiesen,
2013). While Egypt has broader issues with Internet
adoption, and has taken more drastic Internet policies
than the GCC—the Egyptian government resorted to a
complete severance of Internet connections following
the January 2011 revolution—the GCC states have in-
corporated restrictions on the public sphere in keeping
with a cautious approach to new communications tech-
nologies due to their potential political effects (Shires, in
press). Finally, there are significant political rifts within
the GCC, exacerbated since the Qatar crisis in June 2017,
leading to a “quartet” of Egypt, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE separating from the other three states.
Given these diverse regional factors, the spread of
conferences across Egypt and the GCC states is not intu-
itive and creates a “site” for ethnographic observation
in cybersecurity stretching across and between other
socio-political divides. I conducted participant observa-
tion at seven cybersecurity conferences in the region,
summarised in Table 1. These conferences were chosen
due to the length of time held, the range of organizing
bodies and topic, and more prosaic research character-
istics such as budget and time constraints. At these con-
ferences, I repeatedly met the same community of con-
ference speakers, and the same companies and govern-
ment organizations, which suggests that these confer-
ences constitute a unique regional space in which to per-
form cybersecurity expertise.
This personal observation of a distinctive cybersecu-
rity community is supported by a wider analysis of con-
ference speakers. I created a dataset of all invited speak-
ers at the 165 cybersecurity conferences in the region,
based on a range of open sources including conference
programmes and surrounding media. This dataset iden-
tified which conference series were attended by each
speaker and the number of conferences within each se-
ries attended by that speaker. Of the total number of
speakers (1,177), only 96 (8%) had spoken at more than
three conferences and across more than one conference
series (and these had often spoken at many more). This
indicates that although many individuals participate as
speakers at these cybersecurity conferences, a relatively
small number do so consistently over time and are recog-
nised as cybersecurity experts by several conference or-
ganisers.2 In the next section, I use the concept of ritual
to explore the conference performances of this expert
community in more detail.
4. Ritualized Conferences
Cybersecurity conferences are highly ritualized activities.
Ritual was originally a term for the script used to instruct
religious practices or rites, but has become commonly
used to refer to religious practices themselves (Stew-
art & Strathern, 2014). However, many anthropologists
argue that a fundamental distinction between religious
and secular is unhelpful in the analysis of rituals (Grimes,
Table 1.Middle East cybersecurity conferences attended.
Name Location Date attended Years held Organizing body
(to date)
ITU Arab Region Sharm El Sheikh October 2016 2014–2017 Egypt National Telecommunications
Cybersecurity Summit Regulatory Authority (NTRA),
International Telecommunications
Union (ITU)
FIRST Middle East Sharm El Sheikh November 2016 2016 Egyptian NTRA, FIRST
(non-profit association of CERTs)
Cairo Security Camp Cairo November 2016 2010–2017 Bluekaizen (cybersecurity
company)
RSA MENA Abu Dhabi November 2016 2012–2017 RSA (cybersecurity and
(others in Qatar events company)
and Saudi Arabia)
Cybersecurity for Dubai November 2016 2015–2016 Qatalyst Global (cybersecurity
Critical Assets MENA events company)
Middle East Riyadh April 2017 2015–2017 Nispana (events company)
Cybersecurity
ITU Arab Region Muscat November 2017 As above Oman Information Technology
Cybersecurity Summit Authority (ITA), ITU
2 A further step in this analysis would compare this attendance to other regions or other countries in the region such as Iran or Israel. Although space con-
straints prevent such an analysis here, conversations with the “super-speakers” identified above suggest that they rarely if ever participate in confer-
ences in those two countries.
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2006). Instead, we can see all activities as lying on a scale
of ritualizationwith several dimensions, including formal-
ism, disciplined invariance, rule-governance, and symbol-
ism (Bell, 2009, p. 138). Highly ritualized activities pos-
sess these characteristics in greater intensity or quantity
than the surrounding environment, and these character-
istics are often found together, in a mutually reinforc-
ing manner.
The ritualization of cybersecurity conferences is fa-
cilitated by their physical and temporal organization,
which follows a standard pattern for business confer-
ences. The cybersecurity conferences I attended all had
a central presentation room for “keynote” speakers, as
well as several breakout rooms for smaller-scale discus-
sions, with scheduling governed by several written and
unwritten rules: printed schedules, food and drink re-
quirements, unexpected absences, and the importance
of the speaker. There was a separate area for marketing
stands by cybersecurity companies, who paid for spaces.
Some companies paid for higher levels of sponsorship,
in return for a keynote slot and branding on presenta-
tions, notes, and conference paraphernalia such as lan-
yards, which serve as constant symbolic reminders of
their contribution. This overall format is largely due to
what Bell terms ‘disciplined invariance’—i.e., deliberate
repetition—created by the logistical and financial assem-
blage behind the conference. Although the conferences
themselves were often hosted by a national government
organization involved in cybersecurity, the organization
of the conference was outsourced to events companies
who imprint standard formats onto the cybersecurity
community (following Rappaport’s formulation of the
conditions of ritual, conferences are largely “encoded by
other than performers”; Rappaport, 1999, p. 32). As such,
these conferences are ritualized in the sense that they
are more rule-governed, invariant, and formalised than
the day-to-day work of cybersecurity professionals.
To understand how this ritualization enhances the
performance of cybersecurity expertise, we can compare
cybersecurity conferences to similar cases. In a closely
related context, the concept of ritual has been used to
argue that “hacker” conferences embody a particular
“lifeworld”, which is brought into being through hackers
spending short, intense periods of time together focus-
ing on their common passion (Coleman, 2010). However,
in her participant observation Coleman also detected dif-
ferences in the “moral economy” of conferences:
The differences between the American Psychiatric As-
sociation annualmeetings, where doctors are dressed
in suits and mill about during the day at San Fran-
cisco’s Moscone Center, retiring individually in the
evening to a luxury San Francisco high-rise hotel after
a nice dinner, and the outdoor festival held by Euro-
pean hackers, where bodies are clothed in tee-shirts
and shorts (if that), and many participants can be
found sleeping together under the stars of the night,
are difficult to deny. (Coleman, 2010, p. 67)
Despite their similar content to the hacker conferences
described by Coleman—malware analysis, details of
vulnerabilities, stories of famous hacks, and so on—
cybersecurity conferences appear to have as much in
common with the drab medical gatherings to which she
juxtaposes the hackers’ “ritual celebration”. The cyber-
security conferences I attended were held in luxury ho-
tels, with high-quality food and drink available through-
out. Formal dress was required (Figure 2). As is the case
for cybersecurity and technology sectors more gener-
ally, there were far more men than women at these
Figure 2. Arab Region Cybersecurity Summit 2017 (Source: Author’s own photo).
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conferences, and only 4 of the 96 frequent speakers
(4%) identified in Part 3 were women.3 Although the
post-conference recreational activities occasionally re-
sembled hacker conferences more closely—for example,
poetry recitation on a trip to the beach—there was just
asmuch “milling about”. If cybersecurity conferences cre-
ate a lifeworld, it is not that of the hacker.
Given these differences, another comparison may be
useful. Scholars have also conducted participant obser-
vation at trade fairs for security products (defence tech-
nologies, policing equipment, surveillance, and so on).
These fairs have a shared genealogy with the cybersecu-
rity conferences I attended, in that some cybersecurity
conferences in theMiddle East are offshoots of larger de-
fence and security fairs, and defence companies are cen-
tral figures in the cybersecurity market. In an analysis of
a long-running trade fair in the UK, Alexander argues that
“these spaces are pivotal in the dissemination, propaga-
tion, and reformulation of changing attitudes towards se-
curity” (Alexander, 2014, p. 18), as they underpin the
“logic of a particular mind-set regarding what it means
to consume security as a commodity” (Alexander, 2014).
Although cybersecurity conferences also involve the
sharing of a security mind-set, Alexander’s description of
security fairs as hotspots for the “intensive exchange of
knowledge [and] new ideas” only partly resonates with
my participant observation. Although cybersecurity con-
ference programs are full of talks on professional top-
ics, most delegates spend little time listening to them.
Other than the keynote speeches, which are well at-
tended partly due to greater interest and partly greater
enforcement from the conference organizers, there is
ample opportunity to spend time at trade stalls, refresh-
ment places, in hotel lobbies or (if the heat permits)
outside at lengthy cigarette breaks. Panel discussions of-
ten elicit few questions and little audience participation.
When delegates are in the audience,most of their time is
spent on devices; sometimes working, but also as an in-
stinctive response to what is almost downtime. Network-
ing is a large part of these conferences, but they also offer
a space to relax, to catch up on work, and to spend time
away from the desk.
Given the unclear attention paid by conference at-
tendees to formal methods of disseminating knowledge,
I use ritual theorists’ focus on space (e.g. Turner, 1977),
to show how the shared format of these conferences
shapes the performance of expertise. The fundamental
division in this physical space is between the outer layer
of company-branded booths and the inner layer of pre-
sentation rooms; in other words, between a space for
commerce (the trade stands) and a space for knowledge
(the central auditorium and breakout rooms). Speakers
conform to this ritual division in their on-stage perfor-
mance, disclaiming any “sales pitch” when delivering
talks, even about their product, although this is often un-
dermined by the company copyright of their slides. The
conference space is therefore an explicit acknowledge-
ment and simultaneous separation of both the myriad
commercial incentives for conference organizers, hosts,
speakers, and attendees at the outer layer, and their
claims to possess an independent and unbiased expert
knowledge at the inner layer.
The separation of knowledge and commerce shapes
cybersecurity expertise in twoways, enhanced by the for-
malism and invariance identified above. First, this sepa-
ration expresses an ideal version of cybersecurity exper-
tise. Despite the competitive political and commercial
struggles between individuals and organizations that ex-
ist in any expert domain, this separation creates a guid-
ing principle or myth of “pure” cybersecurity knowledge,
untainted by these struggles, which encourages the for-
mation of the discipline itself as a new area of disinter-
ested inquiry. Second, this physical separation inscribes
the ability to alter their performance between these
spaces—to shift repertoire—as a core skill for cybersecu-
rity experts. The same people deliver their independent
expert judgement on stage, and then an unashamedly
partisan view of their superior product after returning
to their booth. I do not mean to imply that either is in-
correct, or that to do both is necessarily hypocritical, but
that this duality is imposed by the separation of the con-
ference space itself. Cybersecurity expertise is thus not
just the successful performance of riskmanagement, but
one which is essentially flexible, with several registers
and the capacity for context-based improvisation.
This physical separation and performative disconnect
between knowledge and commerce suggests that cyber-
security expertise does not match either close compar-
ison above: it is neither an explicit commodification of
security nor a liberated hacker’s lifeworld. Instead, the
heart of cybersecurity expertise is the simultaneous em-
brace of an underlying commercial logic and the ideal
of a neutral judgement of new technological risks. This
double movement exists elsewhere in cybersecurity: in
the contest over cybersecurity qualifications, in the chal-
lenges of cybersecurity public-private partnerships (Carr,
2016), and the rise of the “cyber-industrial complex”
(Deibert & Rohozinski, 2011). However, conferences, as
ritualized occasions for the performance of expertise to
other experts, uniquely equip cybersecurity profession-
als with the repertoire incorporating this double move-
ment, and so are key sites for the production of cyberse-
curity expertise more broadly.
5. Conclusion
This article has completed three tasks. First, it reori-
ented discussions around cybersecurity expertise, often
3 This may be changing: conversations at these conferences suggest that around half of citizens training in cybersecurity in the smaller Gulf states are fe-
male (themselves a small proportion of cybersecurity professionals overall, due to the overwhelmingly male expatriate technology community). These
simple gender proportions do not accurately portray the complexities of gender performance (both masculinities and femininities) in cybersecurity in
the region, which deserve a separate study.
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expressed as a skills gap, towards a conception of ex-
pertise as successful performance. Cybersecurity exper-
tise should not be thought of as a gap to be closed, be-
cause the requirements for successful performance grow
together with the widening of the domain. Second, it
identified cybersecurity conferences as key sites of ex-
pert performance and used the example of cybersecu-
rity conferences in the Middle East to show how such
conferences bring together a diverse community across
international divisions. Third, it analysed these confer-
ences as ritualized activities, which physically separate
commercial transactions and knowledge production in a
way which makes possible the emergence of cybersecu-
rity expertise itself as a body of knowledge.
Themain limitation of this article is that, due to space
constraints, it has focused only on the spatial perfor-
mance of expertise in the overall conference environ-
ment. Further work would distinguish more finely be-
tween the different genealogies of cybersecurity profes-
sionals (defence, intelligence, IT, engineering, and so on),
and would track the effect of this professional “habitus”
on cybersecurity worldviews, analysing not just commer-
cial underpinnings but also wider threat construction.
A related limitation is that this article relies on personal
observation of expert performance (albeit informed by
extensive interaction with the expert community) but
does not investigate the perception of this performance
by experts themselves, or otherwise provide a space for
their voices. Further work, drawing explicitly on inter-
views and conference discourse, would correct this im-
balance and provide a more comprehensive picture of
cybersecurity expert performance.
This investigation has several implications for other
areas of IR. First, it provides a performance-based inter-
pretation of the dynamics of a growing arena of knowl-
edge which could be applied to other skilled domains
in international politics. Second, it provides an empiri-
cal treatment of cybersecurity conferences in the Middle
East, which crosses familiar boundaries and offers a new
reading of regional dynamics with implications outside cy-
bersecurity. Finally, it underlines the importance of rit-
ual in analysing the dynamics of international behaviour,
especially conferences and conference-like events, which
are frequent occurrences in international politics on top-
ics ranging from peace negotiations to climate change
treaties. Some of the ritualized characteristics noted here
may appear, with similar symbolism, in these other areas.
Postscript
In this postscript, I briefly reflect on my participation in
the cybersecurity conferences above. Reflexive analysis
of my own epistemological, moral, and other commit-
ments is a key aspect of participant observation. This is
especially important as I use the concept of ritual, which
imputes significance to an activity which may not be ex-
pressed or recognised by other participants. In this anal-
ysis, I attempted to avoid two related pitfalls. The first is
an assumption of superiority: that the interpretation of-
fered here is somehow truer, better, or more accurate
than an “inside” interpretation. The second is a refusal
of symmetry. As Latour notes, ritual and its associated
concepts are often reserved for those who are assumed
not to be “Modern” and are not applied symmetrically to
Modern practices (Latour, 2010).
To counter these pitfalls, the analysis above is an
intervention in a conversation not only with other aca-
demics, but with conference participants as well, to be
judged and critiqued on both levels. Furthermore, cyber-
security professionals, as highly qualified graduates of ad-
vanced engineering and scientific courses, are asModern
in Latour’s sense, if not more so, than any social scientist
who works with and alongside them. Consequently, my
methods and conclusion are as open to critique by them
as much as their epistemological stance is questioned by
this article.
Although the empirical site is the Middle East, rather
than the “West”, I do not mean to imply homogeneity.
This community includes people from across the world,
with varied religious, political, and social backgrounds.
Countries of origin for speakers include South Korea, Sin-
gapore, China, Europe and the US, and conference atten-
dees with a more permanent presence in the region in-
clude expatriate workers from South Asia and Europe,
as well as immigrants within the region itself (notably
Egyptian nationals throughout the GCC, due to proxim-
ity and attractive market conditions). While some reli-
gious and cultural formulations are nearly always present
(such as religious introductions to formal speech used in-
stinctively by many Muslims and sometimes attempted
sympathetically by non-Muslim presenters), there are as
many moments which present a different set of cultural
and linguistic associations and hierarchies, such as native
Arabic speakers who find it easier to switch into English
to present on technical cybersecurity topics.
Nonetheless, my own profile as a white male and a
native English speaker with working Arabic proficiency
was important. I was quickly put into specific categories—
consultant, guest speaker—by my interlocutors, and
treated in a way which would have changed had my gen-
der, ethnicity, or language been different. I wore a badge
accurately describing me as a member of the University
of Oxford, which also had a significant impact on my
reception. As a recognisable label with extensive social
and academic associations, “Oxford” both increased my
acceptance and made it suspicious: as one interlocutor
mentioned, pointing out Oxford University’s connection
to the UK intelligence community, “they don’t knowwho
you are, you come from a country with a bad history
in these things, they don’t know what you will do with
the information”.
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